Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2017

Orchestrating Without Partiture;
Getting Information Systems Ready to the Future of Crisis Diplomacy
Juha S. Knuuttila
Turku University of Applied Sciences
juha.s.knuuttila@turkuamk.fi

“Diplomacy is very powerful environment.”
-Jay F. Nunamaker Jr., Spring 1994

Abstract
Crisis in and around Ukraine is becoming the first
show-case in multilateral diplomacy, where Remotely
Piloted Aircraft
Systems (RPAS) and other
technologies are deployed to produce information for
the diplomatic processes of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)and to
public at the same time. This has taken place in a very
rapid manner without time for descent planning and
through learning by doing before and in the middle of
the start and development of the crisis special
monitoring mission based on the consensus of 57
member states.
This paper approaches these multi-lateral
diplomacy scenes by looking at the work done through
two disciplines which “orchestrate”; Social Science
and Information Systems. Abbot et al. orchestration
theory application into OSCE and to its “Ukraine
toolbox” needs more research, in which e.g. IS
literature´s socio-technical modeling methods will be
helpful in order to bridge recognized gaps from
practice and literature.
Information system researchers and developers
are needed in more active roles as intermediaries to
complement existing principal-agent e.g. OSCERPAS and other ICT vendor relationships. More
theoretical and empirical research is needed to make
the IGOs’ orchestration to meet what ICT can offer
for future crisis diplomacy.
Keywords: Inter-governmental Organizations
(IGOs), orchestration theory, Remotely Piloted
Aircraft System (RPAS), multilateral diplomacy,
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), information system development, Ukraine
Special Monitoring Mission (SMM)

The foundations for the Organization on Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were laid down in the
preparatory process for the Helsinki Final Act signed in
Helsinki conference by heads of states 1975. [1]
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest security-oriented
intergovernmental organization (later as IGO). Its
mandate includes issues such as arms control and the
promotion of human rights, freedom of the press and
fair elections. It employs around 3,500 (, of which 1106
people in Ukraine Special Monitoring Mission (SMM)
at the 31st August 2016) people, mostly in its field
operations but also in its secretariat in Vienna, Austria,
and its institutions. The OSCE is concerned with early
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and
post-conflict rehabilitation. Its 57 participating states
are located in Europe, northern and central Asia and
North America and cover much of the land area of the
Northern Hemisphere. It was created during the Cold
War era as an East–West forum. [2][3][4]
As the personnel numbers above show among the field
operations the weight of Ukraine SMM is big. One
interviewee for this study described OSCE
“…as politically born again, because no other organization
– if any- is capable of tackling crisis in and around
Ukraine”.[5],

as Ukrainian crisis is expressed in diplomatic OSCE
language (bolded by author above).
The essence of Ukraine SMM is presented in the
following table:
Table 1. Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine [4]
Who we are?
-Unarmed civilian monitors;
-Over 700 monitors across Ukraine;
-Over 580 based in the east ;
-From 45 participating States.

1. Introduction: OSCE as an IS
Orchestrator in Crisis Scenes
Including “in and around Ukraine”
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patrolling – 100 times the distance around the globe by
over 18,000 patrols utilizing 284 armored vehicles plus
civilian commercial – not military - remotely piloted
What we do?
-Report the facts as we observe and establish them; aircraft systems (RPASs), which puts SMM’s eyes on
the sky, which are not always welcomed by fighting
-Gather information and report on the security situation;
parties. In some cases have shot OSCE´s SMM´s
-Report on the humanitarian situation and people’s
needs, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid ofremotely piloted aircrafts (RPAs) down or jammed their
other organizations;
radio links. [3]
-Help to establish dialogue and local ceasefires.

1.1. Two Disciplines, Which “Orchestrate”

Important to understand:
-It is up to the sides to stop the fighting;
-We do not conduct investigations, but report on facts; When an IGO - like in Ukraine SMM - is deploying its
relatively small resources to address large challenges by
-We do not deliver, but facilitate the delivery of
bringing together available public and private actors´
humanitarian aid of other organizations

activities, these activities have been described by the
verb “to orchestrate” after a genuine theory laying
So far, the OSCE’s outputs in reporting about crisis in Social Science studies conducted by Abbot et al. [10]
and around Ukraine, has been well received by their in an international research project 2009-2015. It would
audiences at least by numbers according to following be too simple to say in terms of information systems,
that to orchestrate is to in-, out- or right-source, even if
table 2 [3].
it has some features of all these sourcing modes.
Orchestration theory in this context [explained deeper
Table 2. Ukraine Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in chapter 2.]
Reporting By Numbers in 2015 [3]
Following are four examples of the uses of term
“orchestrate” from another discipline, Information
306 DAILY REPORTS
Systems (IS):
51 WEEKLY REPORTS
30 SPOT REPORTS
8 THEMATIC REPORTS
4 BRIEFINGS to the UN Security Council
THOUSANDS of media clips
OVER 16,000 Twitter followers
@OSCE_SMM
OVER 5,600 Facebook likes
As the table 2 shows OSCE´s SMM has widened its
informating beyond WWW and mailing services to
Twitter and Facebook.

Picture 1. OSCE SMM monitors assessing the impact
of shelling in Mariupol, January 2015 [6]

Firstly, Jessup and Valacich.(1993) [11] described
“orchestrated workflow” as one scenario for group
support system development trajectories,which
nowadays look very modest when taking into account
the multiplicity of new technologies. Their scenario
affected the work of Lyytinen et al. [7] [8] and Knuuttila
et al. [9].
Secondly, service orchestration plays an important part
in a service-oriented architecture (SOA). Web service
orchestration can be contrasted with web service
choreography, the execution of asynchronous tasks
without a central coordinator. [12]
Thirdly, a cloud orchestrator is programming that
manages the interconnections and interactions among
cloud-based and on-premises business units. To
orchestrate something is to arrange various components
so they achieve a desired result. In an IT context, this
involves combining tasks into workflows so the
provisioning and management of various IT
components and their associated resources can be
automated. This endeavor is more complex in a cloud
environment because it involves interconnecting
processes running across heterogeneous systems in
multiple locations. [13]

All these required information for reports etc. has been Fourthly, Ross and Beck [14] have presented an article
acquired by patrols on the ground by the end of year on “How to Orchestrate IT Project Portfolios More
2015 (see picture above) with over 4 million km of Successfully” from the risk management angle.
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The UAVs were deployed on a commercial basis, because
All four orchestrating examples deal with governance
military UAVs of western countries flown by their
like Abbot et al. [10], but mainly in a limited technical
uniformed officers were out of question for Russians.”
business context. How much these IS related
“orchestrations” have to do with the present ICT
environment of the OSCE will remain as subject for A summary of these lines tell, that this process did not
further studies, which require different sets of people to go by the book or discipline with or without
orchestrating written before. Neukirch [15] has
be interviewed from the OSCE.
published a more polished chronology of this process,
Lyytinen et al. [7] have shown, that the Conference for which will be cited later.
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), direct
predecessor of OSCE, community and multi-lateral At the end of the day and the month everything is
diplomacy need advanced approaches from MIS political in the OSCE. Politicking and understanding its
researchers, too, who have been addressing mainly consequences was and will be part of the job for
single business organizations in Computer Supported diplomats, IS designers, vendors, researchers etc. in the
OSCE context.
Co-operative Work (CSCW) literature.

1.3.Research Question

Further Lyytinen et al. [8] have demonstrated why and
how multi-lateral diplomacy is not business as usual nor
unusual business, that needed special constructs of
hard- and software in terms of CSCW.

The main research question for this paper is:
What lessons can be learned for further IGOs´
orchestration from the OSCE’s work in
deploying information systems, e.g. RPASs,
into crisis in and around Ukraine for future
multi-lateral crisis diplomacy?

Knuuttila et al. [9] drafted a concept for diplomats’
work station for multi-lateral conferencing before
mobile computing era.
These studies on applying at that time modern meeting
support IS into multilateral diplomatic procedures
released meeting support system´s forerunner Jay F.
Nunamaker´s proverb about power-fullness of
diplomacy cited in the beginning.

The lessons will be formed from recognizing and
bridging as far as possible the gaps between different
actors in multi-lateral diplomacy process seen from the
research angle. These gaps will be recognized from
diplomatic political mood-oriented-practice and from
1.2. Applying Modern Mobile IT in the mode-oriented Social Science and Information Systems
Form of RPASs into the Ukraine SMM literature as described in the next chapters.
The developments around the use of social media
(see above Table 2 ) must have been left out from this
article due to space limitations as well as the latest
technical developments in commercially available
security related ICT, which might facilitate the work of
Ukraine SMM.

This chapter will show why and how the applying now
modern mobile ISs in the form of RPASs into to the
day´s multilateral diplomacy is still challenging and
keeping “diplomacy very powerful environment” for IS
vendors as developers and researchers, also.
Let us the interviewees [5] for this study to describe the
deployment of RPASs (named UAVs in OSCE
language):

The target is to survey the way for further research
by raising new topics to the agenda by recognizing
existing gaps derived from practice and literature.

“There was hard political pressure to get the
propellers in to air and nobody thought, what the f**k to
do with the data... western states´ representatives saw
UAVs as magic bullets…
The company , who won the first bidding for UAVs,
told , that the first possible deployment would be in 4
months, but the Swiss [who were the OSCE´s
chairmanship country at the time] stressed , that UAVs
must be deployed within the mission([SMM) in one
month…
Nobody really had time to think, what we are doing…
containers were put on the road to Kiev for test flights and
operation was built in a month!

2. The OSCE as an Orchestrator;
Recognizing the Gap from
Literature
In building hypotheses for orchestration studies two
contrasting models are used. The O-I-T-model specifies
the relationships between an orchestrator (O), which
enlists and supports the activities of an intermediary (I),
which in turn governs the behaviorlof one or more
targets (T). O-I-T-model is contrasted with the P-Amodel, which specifies the relationship between a
principal (P), which delegates tasks, and an agent (A),
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which carries them out. Knitting these models together
starts with the observation, that states are principals to
IGOs as agents, but IGOs are orchestrators of
intermediaries who (sometimes) have states as targets.
[10]
Orchestration highlights nuanced relationships among
governance actors, whereas many literatures on global
governance focus on particular actors seen as acting
largely in isolation. More concretely, orchestration
highlights the inner workings of regime complexes and
other governance structures: in contrast to dominant
literature, it emphasizes how participants with agency
create, maintain and manage governance complexes.

object. This is the case in whole project described in the
volume of Abbot et al. [10].
There is no literature, which studies OSCE as an avant
garde IGO related to the orchestration theory. For
example, the OSCE as an IGO is many-faced difficult
research object: it can act in some cases according to
military rules (e.g. monitoring military exercises) and
in some cases according to civil rules (e.g. monitoring
elections). Given the 14 instruments of “Ukraine
toolbox” [see paragraph xx] with their mandate
principles and procedures, they are not easily
categorized to fit into present orchestration theory’s
taxonomies derived from more single-area governing
IGOs.

Orchestration theory helps us analyze how IGOs
interact with their institutional ecosystems, with each
participant shaping the others’ authority [10] e.g. OSCE
helps state the authority of non-state actors in and
around Ukraine.

As stated above SMM revitalized the OSCE as a major
player in the international scenes of diplomacy and its
rapid and innovative use of RPASs revealed again the
gaps and steep learning curves between practitioner
diplomats and vendors not to mention researchers.
The five general orchestration techniques are widely (Compare to Knuuttila et al. [9]
used and often in combination, according to several
case study investigations in the volume of International These gaps must be bridged with research in order to
Organizations as Orchestrators: convening, agenda help the OSCE and other IGO´s to better fulfill their
setting, assistance, endorsement and coordination.
crisis governing mandates for peacebuilding in the
future.
Convening is used to create purpose-built
intermediaries. Assistance plays a special role in
2.1.RPAS as an Information System
supporting rule implementation. Endorsement is
particularly important for rule-making intermediaries. The special role given to deployment of RPASs as an
Agenda setting and coordination, while used in many information system is based on following features:
contexts, are especially important for orchestrating
regime complexes. [10]
- In RPAS “at the maximum 30 % of the system is
flying and 70 % is on the ground including the pilot,
Dai [16] in his article titled as this chapter in Abbot et why expression “unmanned” is not adequate
al [10] argues, that IGOs rationally adapt to their [interviews]. This is not usually understood by vendors
strategic environment by working around binding of these systems, who use the same approach as to car
constraints and tapping into alternative resources made buyers: “Flexibility was also the key to success when
available by non-state actors. Under certain the SMM was in urgent need of unarmed unmanned
circumstances, it may be both efficient and effective for aerial vehicles (UAVs) and an additional 70 armored
IGOs to enlist non-state intermediaries to help monitor vehicles in the summer.”[3]
and enforce states´ compliance. In this sense, Dai
argues, that orchestration is an optimal strategy of -RPAS deployment is literally crossing borders not only
geographically but also between intelligence,
adaptation.[16]
diplomatic and public spheres: What used to be sole
Dai provides empirical support through comparative property of more or less military intelligence services
study of IGOs for Abbots et al.´s orchestration theory has now become open to diplomats as well as to public.
hypotheses, especially goal divergence and Diplomats employed by the OSCE secretariat moderate
intermediary availability. However, Dai finds the the information flow to their colleagues and to the
chances for greater orchestration in these areas smaller public.
for Security IGOs than for Human Rights IGOs. (See
[16 , 150-155] The OSCE by its nature is Security IGO - RPASs, as everything else including financing, were
and on the other hand Human Rights IGO as well as brought into to OSCE’s Ukraine SMM in very rapid and
Environmental IGO and Trade IGO at the same time, flexible manner, which is exposing the strengths and
too, which all four are categories in Dai´s analysis, weaknesses to research. Everybody understands the
which does not cover the OSCE at all as main research constraints caused by rapid set-up of SMM and makes
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exchange of views easy including talking to researchers
regardless your political standpoint or nationality.

3.2.Set-up of Ukraine SMM
The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

3. The Rapid Set-Up of Ukraine SMM is being deployed following a request to the OSCE by
the government of Ukraine and a consensus agreement
Using RPASs; Recognizing Gaps
by all 57 OSCE participating States. The monitors are
from Practice

to contribute to reducing tensions and fostering peace,
RPASs usage is spreading to other IGO´s to be used for stability and security [17]. A lot of attention was paid to
remote sensing in areas and duties, where manned keep SMM’s “civilian character and civilian face.
aircrafts are unfeasible [5][18]. Ukraine SMM is now in Nonetheless, an “add-on” military mission might be
avantgarde of civilian RPASs use and lessons learned considered in support of the SMM, but it would need a
from there are in focus by all major players of separate mandate.” [15]]
diplomatic scene including by-lined military services.
Germany, France, Italy and Russian Federation offered
military UAV support to SMM during mandate
negotiations. After this offer informal discussions
3.1. Research Method and Knowledge
started about usage of military UAVs to support SMM
Acquisition
for gathering information. ”Only the UAVs would fly
over the conflict zone and the military personnel –
This survey-type paper is based on, and its conclusions
armed and in uniform – would stay outside it. [15]
are drawn from, the interaction between six sources:
While these political level consultations over military
UAV “add-on” usage went on the OSCE had already
1. Participation in and facilitation of a two-day deployed commercially operated civilian UAVs, which
Thematic Meeting of the OSCE Border
carried out their maiden flight on 23 October 2014 near
Security and Management National Focal
Mariupol. “This was exactly four months after the idea
Points Network on Emerging Technologies in
of using UAVs was first voiced in an internal concept
Border Security and Management – Use of
paper, and just over three months after the decision was
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and related made. Given the lead times that such projects usually
expert discussions in October 2015.
have, this, alongside the rapid deployment of the SMM
2. Discussions in“Breaking the Ice of Frozen in March 2014 is another example how fast the OSCE
Conflicts? Understanding Territorial Conflicts is able to react.
in East and Southeast Europe” in July 2016,
seminar organized by the University of
“By deploying unmanned aircraft systems the OSCE
Regensburg
wanted to show that they were up to date … This
3. 21 semi-structured expert interviews of various
deployment was not intended for the situation that later
developed in Ukraine” [5]
players involved in and associated with
political diplomatic processes in the OSCE and
its Parliamentary Assembly meeting in In March 2014, all 57 participating States of the OSCE
Helsinki June 2015 and the deployment of unanimously agreed to establish the OSCE Special
RPAS by the OSCE in monitoring the Ukraine Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine. The SMM to
Ukraine is an unarmed, civilian mission and its main
crisis [5].
4. Follow-up of public OSCE reporting on its tasks are to observe and report in an impartial and
activities related to Ukraine and missions in objective way on the situation. The SMM also
establishes and reports facts in response to specific
general.[3]
5. Literature review of related recent articles in incidents [18].
political science and information systems.
6. Learnings from the participation into 5 year A separate confidential memorandum of understanding
EU-funded AIRBEAM project, in which was drawn up concerning the operating of RPAS in
among other outcomes 599 law enforcement Ukrainian air space.
authorities´ use scenarios for unmanned aerial
“A lot of attention was paid to the establishment of the
vehicles were drafted [17]
(RPAS) service itself into Ukraine … and not to make a
process that would link the data from the RPA to the
political reporting to the OSCE headquarters in Vienna.”
[5]

To facilitate the answering of the research question gaps
from literature in and from practice have been
recognized and bridged as far as possible in the
premises of this article.
On the 17th of October 2014 Didier Burkhalter, Swiss
Foreign Minister and OSCE Chairperson-in Office
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thanked Italy, France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia for
their offers to place RPAs and associated personnel at
the disposal of the OSCE in order to enhance its
monitoring capacities in Ukraine [20].

the strategies employed are profoundly influenced by
whether an entity is located within the UN Secretariat,
a UN specialized agency, a European organization (the
European Union, EU; the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, OSCE), or merely within the
government of an individual member state. [26]

On the 23th of October 2014 the OSCE SMM
successfully completed the maiden flight of its
unarmed
RPAs.
The
RPASs
(Schiebel
CAMCOPTER® S-100) were being provided, flown
and maintained by the Austrian company Schiebel.
They are under contract to the OSCE and under the
authority and direction of the SMM. Data collected is
the property of the OSCE and for the sole use of that
organization.

4.1. Orchestrating Monitoring: the
Adaptation of Ukraine Toolbox
Like the crisis in and around Ukraine developed
step by step, which were far from equal in size and
timing, the corresponding Ukraine toolbox evolved
gradually in different decision making forum of the
OSCE structures, which involve levels from
parliamentary and inter-governmental to OSCE intraagency actions.
“The OSCE has been and is using 14 different kinds
of structures and organizations in governance of crisis in
and around Ukraine. They all have their mandate, birth
history and rulings based on consensus decisions made in
some phase of the OSCE process. In everyday use they are
called “OSCE’s Ukraine toolbox” [5]

Picture 2. CAMCOPTER® S-100, prior to deployment by
the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine [21] A
new service provider is taking over the RPASs service
for SMM by using three different RPAs for different
operation distances.[5]

Due to space limitations in this paper cannot present the
table) to start modeling of “Ukraine toolbox” [22],
which will be helpful for future work by explaining the
nature of each tool and their inter-play would take
several papers’ space. Most likely, further study of
simultaneous functioning of these different tools in
3.3.Gaps from Practice
accordance to orchestration theory will lead to develop
the
classifications and conceptual taxonomies of Dai
An analysis of practice related literature and interviews
[16]
and Abbot et al. [10].
for this study in italic about the deployment of
RPA/UAVs reveal at least following gaps from the
4.2. Addressing the OSCE´s Procurement
practice:

Processes
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)

gap between political requirements and
technical realities
gap in political trust between major member
states
gap in the procurement/vending process
gap in trained personnel
gap in desired time for design, testing and
deployment
gap - or rather lack – of desired information
system(s) as outcome(s)
gap in beliefs vs. realities, what RPASs can
contribute
gab etween military and civil efforts to deploy
RPASs

The successful adaptation of RPASs should always
include
structured
design,
purchase,
and
implementation projects. These should take into
account the operating of the flying platform, attached
sensors, communications, and information sharing with
other information systems, such as command and
control or situational awareness systems[19]
The following structure was able to function without
“cumbersome procedures” [15] in case of the OSCE´s
Ukraine SMM. See the following picture’s corner down
left, where category “Goods” takes care of ICT and
RPAS procurement like buying cars for the mission.

4. Modeling the Multi-modal OSCE to
meet Orchestrating theories
An agency’s mandate shapes its approach to
peacebuilding, and hence the conception of this term
employed by agency staff. The objectives sought and
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Picture 3.Task-Oriented Management according
to OSCE´s GO Programme [23]_
Experience was gained (for the OSCE) in the use of
RPAS in United Nation missions in Africa It is unclear
how this experience was taken into account when
deploying RPAS in a rushed manner in the OSCE mission
in Ukraine.” [5].

Picture 4. Software intensive IS acquisition process
[24]

4.3. Gaps from literature
Adding the first gap from literature to be added to the
above-mentioned list of gaps from practice in previous
chapter:

When the use of RPASs was established, all
attention was focused on getting approval for flights
from Ukraine. At that time a crisis was not yet at hand
and RPA flights were considered to be a measure of
building confidence [5].

i)

gap in Abbot et al.’s orchestrating theory,
which does not cover the OSCE in general and
has not yet been applied to it and its “Ukraine
toolkit” ( described in chapter 2)
j) gap in the deployment/procurement of
information system(s) in crisis in a rapid
manner (see chapter 4.2 above).
k) gap in the modeling of multi-lateral diplomacy
real workflows , not by-the-book in nowaday´s
computing age, in which new diplomat and
staff generations use their devices and internet
presence disregarding generation gaps as they
please
l) gap in the “reverse engineering” ,like going
back to pencil and paper and meetings without
IT tools, due to mistrust in information
security measures in diplomacy governance
after the cases of a state eavesdropping another
state by using ICT[5], not to mention
Snowden, Manning, Assange, Wikileaks etc.

“The costs of RPAS usage started to swallow an ever
greater part of the 88 million Euro mission budget,
because flights became more and more frequent”, and
“better, more expensive surveillance cameras were
added”. “One RPA with this equipment including antijamming capacities may cost over one million euros and
insurance costs with tightening conditions are skyrocketing for use in Ukraine SMM.” [5].

The OSCE is in need of a comprehensive
informating system to serve all stakeholders of
“Ukraine toolbox”.
Therefore a proven system for information system
creation and procurement like in following Picture 4 is
needed. How many of this boxes in the Picture can be
really worked through, when next politically motivated
rapid ICT deployment will take place?

The OSCE has been and is using 14 different kinds of
structures and organizations in governance of crisis in
and around Ukraine. They all have their mandate, birth
history and rulings based on consensus decisions made
in some phase of the OSCE process. In everyday use
they are called “OSCE’s Ukraine toolbox” [5Due to
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space limitations in this paper we concentrate into to the
table row number 4 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission.
Modeling, which might be very helpful for future work,
and explaining the nature of each tool and their interplay would take several papers’ space.

5. Conclusions:
Research

Topics

for

New

structures by using intermediaries in a creative manner,
which is the core of Abbot et al.[10] orchestration
theory. IS people take the number of actors and their
roles more “given” and keep the actors in their
traditional collaborative roles and modes, while OSCE
diplomats and staff are in more innovative mood to
fight for peace.

How to make these Social Science orchestration
theories to shake hands with IS orchestration
In the introduction two disciplines, which “orchestrate”, technologies? Picture 5 gives only a limited, partial
were presented. These disciplines, Social and answer to the research question.
Information Systems Sciences, have different
approaches to crisis governance. In the special crisis These hand-shakings are needed to start working for
informatics number of CSCW Journal it was concluded: bridging the gaps pointed out in this paper. These handResearch in civil security and crisis management usually aims
to improve the ‘resilience’ of a system (e.g., a company, a
city, a community, a nation), its ability to resist disturbances
of its consistent state as well as its ability to return to this
consistent state once being disturbed. It has been a remarkable
development that even at important publication venues in
crisis management, the analysis of and the design for
collaborative settings has become the predominant research
discourse (see e.g. the proceedings of the ISCRAM 2014
conference, recent issues of journals like the International
Journal on Information Systems in Crisis Response and
Management (IJISCRAM) or the Journal on Homeland
Security and Emergency Management (JHSEM)). The path to
improving resilience in practice may, however, remain
difficult, as relying on collaboration always means to risk
one’s own autonomy.[18]

The last sentence comes in a way to regret the loss of
power in case of collaboration, which is one form
Abbot et al.[10] orchestration taxonomy, of which’s
one basic starting point is the division and use of power
by different actors in order to reach for target.

shakings should take place by arranging future R&D
meetings and workshops including not only
practitioner OSCE diplomats and staff and vendors, but
also interested researchers from their Social, IS and
other Science’s silos away from their comfort zones to
review Ukrainian demarcation zones and ICT used
there. These zones are more powerful environments
than before (e.g. in 1994) in terms of finding new
research gaps as this article shows.
Political science
Communications / Diplomacy
NEED FOR ORCHESTRATION THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Macrolevel
approach

Social/political
constraints

Topdown
studies

Crisis monitoring
through ISs in and
around Ukraine

Information Systems angle may be seen narrower from
micro-organizational approach raising bottom-up from
the experiences by and consequences for a single
organization, which need to be analyzed, too.
Micro-

Bottom-

There are obviously two levels of orchestrations, which level
up
have been illustrated in the following Picture 5. In the approach Technical constraints
studies
upper part are Social Science based macro-level
orchestrations, which use their political mandate in a
top-down manner by inter-governmental organizations NEED FOR ORCHESTRATION THEORY
like OSCE in and around Ukraine. In the lower part Management Information
there are Information Systems based needs for micro- Systems/CSCW/Computer Science
level
orchestrations
for
inter-governmental Data Communications/ Signal Processing
organizations and, for instance, for their RPAS service RPAS Engineering etc.
providers.
Picture 5. Elements for further socio-technical
The macro-level approach misses the details, technical
development of orchestration theory for crisis
insights and methods of IS like socio-technical
governance in the OSCE framework. Arrows
methodology in designing information systems. On the
symbolize research gaps.
other-hand micro-level approach cannot overcome or
go around the constraints laid by power and other
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[5] 21 semi-structured interviews 2015-2016 for this study.
Notes are possessed by the author. Direct citations from
interviews are printed in italic.

Of course, this micro-macro-level contrasting has its
limitations, but it may offer new venues to further
theory building.
More research is needed to seek common denominators
to these different orchestrating communities in order to
find answers to the research question, whether IS R&D
community can meet the challenges of macro-level
orchestration done in the IGOs like OSCE?
At the moment it seems, that modeling and theory
building work done in the Social Science side is
leading. Picture 5 gives only a limited , partial answer
to the research question, what kind of lessons should be
develop by using knowledge and skills of Social and IS
scientists , too.
OSCE´s role as orchestrator needs more research as
suggested above, but one must remember that the
conductors – in order to continue the use of musical
metaphors – of the crisis scene are sides of the crises.

“All activities by the SMM are guided by the aim to
achieve normalization and stabilization of the situation in
Ukraine. As our numbers expand, these efforts will be
further strengthened. But the political will for a full
ceasefire and a political solution and peace must come
from the sides [of crisis].”

Only political solution and peace will enable f further
orchestrating for the build-up of civil society in and
around Ukraine. This will be “ more of a Jazz Ensemble
than a Classical Concert “ with partiture as German
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier put it [25].

[2] Galbreath, David J. (2007). The Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Routledge. New York, NY.
[3] OSCE,

Annual

report

http://www.osce.org/annual-report/2015.
[4] [http://www.osce.org/ukrainesmm/262211?download=true]

2015,

[8] Lyytinen, K.,Maaranen, P., Knuuttila, J. (1993).
Unusual Business or Business As Usual: An
Investigation of Meeting Support Requirements in
Multilateral Diplomacy in Accounting, Management
and Information Technologies, Volume 3, Number 2,
1993, pp. 97-119 ; Pergamon Press.

[10] Abbot, K.W., Genschel,P.,Snidal ,D., and Zangl B.
(eds.): International Organizations as Orchestrators,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K., 2015
[11] Jessup L.M. and Valacich J.S. Future Directions and
Challenges in the Evolution of Group Support Systems
In Jessup, J.S. Group Support Systems - New
Perspectives, Macmillan Publishing Company, New
York, 1993, 311-318.
[12] http://searchsoa.techtarget.com/definition/service-

orchestration
[13] http://searchitoperations.techtarget.com/definition

How ready, able and welcome are the IS and Social
Science researchers to join the “jam sessions” in the
OSCE HQ salons, which hosted the Vienna Dancing
Conference on European security 200 years ago?

[1] Reimaa,M.: The Helsinki Catch,1975 Edita, Helsinki

[7] Lyytinen, K. ;Maaranen, P., Knuuttila, J. (1993). Why
groups are not always the same-an assessment of twelve
briefs in GDSS, Proceeding of the Twenty-Sixth Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences, 1993,
vol.4 Reimaa, M,: Helsinki Catch, European Security
Accords 1975,Edita Prima, Helsinki, 2008

[9] Knuuttila, J. (1995), DeleGate: Towards a Conference
Diplomat’ Multidimensional Workstation in the
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences - 1995, Volume IV
(edited by Jay F. Nunamaker, Jr. and Ralph H. Sprague,
Jr.) , pp. 513-522 (IEEE Computer Society Press, Los
Alamitos, California).

As OSCE SMM Chief Monitor Apakan in his
statement at the UN Security Council (11 December
2015) said:

6. References

[6] http://www.osce.org/annualreport/2015?download=true]

/cloud-orchestrator
[14] http://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=

1005&amp;context=irwitpm2008
[15] Neukirch, C: The Special Monitoring Missions to
Ukraine:Operational Challenges and New Horizons, in
OSCE Yearbook 2014, Institute for Peace and Security
Policy at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.),pp. 183214, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2015
[16] Dai,X., Orchestrating monitoring: the optimal
adaptation of international organizations in Abbot,
K.W., Genschel P.,Snidal ,D., and Zangl B. (eds.):
International Organizations as Orchestrators,Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge U.K., 2015
[17] Project AIRBEAM (2015). Wise Guys Panel #5, the
proceedings were held under the Chatham House Rule
(author has notes).AIRBEAM is acronym forAIRBorne
information for Emergency situation Awareness and
Monitoring (AIRBEAM) (2009). Proposal, FP7 - Topic

471

430

SEC 2010.4.2.3: Information acquisition using
dedicated platforms, including UAV, aerostatic
platforms(balloons) and satellites, Collaborative Project
(2009-2015). ]. The final report of AIRBEAM

project is in the print.
[18] Pipek,V.,Liu,S.B.,Kerne,A., Crisis Informatics and
Collaboration: A Brief Introduction, in Computer
Supported Co-operative Work (CSCW), December
2014, Volume 23, Issue 4, pp 339–345
[19] Ruoslahti, H., Knuuttila J.: Remotely Piloted Aircraft
Systems (RPAS) for Extereme Missions in the Arctic
and the Monitoring of Ukraine Crisis by the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe ,
Proceedings of the 49th HICSS
[20] OSCE(2015).http://www.osce.org/ukrainesmm/117799
. Retrieved June 05, 2015
[21] OSCE
(2015)http://www.osce.org/ukrainesmm/125813.
Retrieved June 05, 2015.
[22] Knuuttila, J. , Unpublished Table Ukraine Toolbox,
which will be presented separately with this article.

(will be delivered upon request by the author.)
[23] Linares M.., Walker C., Entekhabi K, Cesare de
K.,OSCE Information Management, Share Protect and
Preserve, 2006 ( slide show copies posessed by the
author)
[24] ,Forselius, P.:Software intensive IS acquisition process,
Finnish
Software
Measurement
Forselius
Association,2016 ( translated intoEnglish for this paper)
[25] Steinmeier, F.-WE.,Not a Concert of Powers, But an
Ensemble of Peace, What We Can Learn from Helsinki
for European Security in the 21st Century, , in OSCE
Yearbook 2015, Institute for Peace and Security Policy
at the University of Hamburg/IFSH (ed.),pp. 23-34,
2016
[26] Jenkins,
R.:Peacebulding,
From
concept
commission,,Routledge, New York, 2013

to

472

431

